Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)

If I lead a life of virtue, that may well be good for you. But will it also be good for me? The idea that it will—or even must—is an ancient one, and its appeal runs deep. For if this idea is correct then we can provide everyone with a good reason—arguably the best reason—for being virtuous. However, for all the effort which has been invested in defending the idea, by some of the best minds in the history of philosophy, (...) it remains unproven. Worse, in this skeptical age hardly anyone really believes it. I don't really believe it either, at least not in its strongest forms, but I think that the question is nonetheless worth examining. Even if we cannot show that virtue and self-interest coincide, we can at least measure the breadth of the gap between them. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

This paper describes the change of emphasis that occurred in the teaching of ethics to small groups of clinical students. Although the original focus of the course was on the analysis of ethical dilemmas associated with individual patients known to the students, it soon became evident that there were, for the students themselves, more fundamental ethical dilemmas in their new role as clinical students. These included worries about how to respond when patients asked questions which their consultants had previously deceived (...) them about, worries about inflicting pain on patients, as with intravenous cannulation, and the role of the medical student in the clinical team. We emphasise the need to explore student experiences as part of the process of ethics teaching. (shrink)

An admirable work in philosophical scholarship. As indicated in the title, the book's emphasis is on the logical and metaphysical aspects of Leibniz's philosophy. The consideration of the relationship between the two constitutes the basis for Martin's final evaluation of Leibniz, namely that Leibniz was in error in so far as he tried to bring the same precision to metaphysics as he did to mathematics. Martin develops his interpretation in the perspective of Russell's and consciously notes his agreements and differences (...) with the latter. The author's comprehensive knowledge of the history of philosophy is reflected in his seeing the problems Leibniz dealt with as continuous with the tradition extending back through the Scholastics to Plato. Martin concentrates on the systematic rather than the historical development of Leibniz's own thought. His carefulness in developing his interpretation, together with the clarity of his writing, has resulted in a splendid treatment of a complex subject.—L. W. (shrink)

An ambitious work that attempts to rethink the Meditations with Descartes. Beginning with a thorough discussion of the meaning of method in the Meditations and its role in Descartes' philosophy as a whole, Beck has written a detailed and scholarly work that tries to be as sympathetic as one can perhaps be to the Cartesian enterprise. Beck defends Descartes against criticisms made primarily by his contemporaries rather than by more recent philosophers, although these latter are given some acknowledgement. The book (...) can be read most profitably conjointly with the Meditations themselves, and like most commentaries, tends to become somewhat dense when read apart from its specific subject matter. Beck's most illuminating comments concern the significance of the order of the proofs for God and hence Descartes' own understanding of the ontological argument, and the perspective in which Descartes himself viewed the "mind-body" problem. Drawing heavily on Descartes' personal letters for the clarification of his philosophy, the book is undoubtedly an important contribution to an understanding of the contemporary relevance of Descartes when read on his own terms instead of from the point of view of a particular philosophic school.—L. W. (shrink)

In this timely book L.W. Sumner addresses these issues within the wider context of palliative care for patients in the dying process.

Ever since medical assistance in dying (MAID) became legal in Canada in 2016, controversy has enveloped the refusal by many faith‐based institutions to allow this service on their premises. In a recent article in this journal, Philip and Joshua Shadd have proposed ‘changing the conversation’ on this issue, reframing it as an exercise not of conscience but of an institutional right of self‐governance. This reframing, they claim, will serve to show how health‐care institutions may be justified in refusing to provide (...) MAID on moral or religious grounds. I argue that it will not make it easier to justify institutional refusal, and is likely to make it harder. (shrink)